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Impaired social functioning is a well-known outcome of individuals with agenesis of the
corpus callosum. Social deficits in nonliteral language comprehension, humor, social
reasoning, and recognition of facial expression have all been documented in adults
with agenesis of the corpus callosum. In the present study, we examined the emotional
and mentalizing deficits that contributing to the social-cognitive development in children
with isolated corpus callosum agenesia, including emotion recognition, theory of mind,
executive function, working memory, and behavioral impairments as assessed by the
parents. The study involved children between the age of 6 and 8 years along with typically
developing children who were matched by IQ, age, gender, education, and caregiver’s
education. The findings indicated that children with agenesis of the corpus callosum
exhibited mild impairments in all social factors (recognizing emotions, understanding
theory of mind), and showed more behavioral problems than control children. Taken
together, these findings suggest that reduced callosal connectivity may contribute to
the development of higher-order social-cognitive deficits, involving limits of complex
and rapidly occurring social information to be processed. The studies of AgCC shed
lights of the role of structural connectivity across the hemispheres in neurodevelopmental
disorders.
Keywords: agenesis of the corpus callosum, mentalizing ability, emotion recognition, executive function,
behavioral problems
INTRODUCTION
Agenesis of the corpus callosum (AgCC) is a common cerebral malformation resulting from a
failure to develop fibers that provide the largest connective tract between the two hemispheres.
The corpus callosum consists of over 200 million axons that transfer information between the two
hemispheres. Callosal anomalies are the most frequent malformations in the brain, with imaging
studies indicating that AgCC occurs in 1:4000 live births (Wang et al., 2004; Glass et al., 2008), and
3–5% of neurodevelopmental disorders involve callosal malformation (Bodensteiner et al., 1994).
The developmental absence (agenesis) of the corpus callosum can occur in a variety of conditions
that disrupt the early development of the callosal fibers. Current studies suggest that callosal
dysgenesis can be reflected in inborn errors of metabolism, chromosomal anomalies, or genetic
syndromes (Bedeschi et al., 2006). AgCC can encompass either total or partial absence of the corpus
callous, as well as hypoplasia (formation of a thinner than expected corpus callosum). Surprisingly,
the comparison of partial and total agenesis of the corpus callosum showed only slight differences
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in medical and behavioral outcomes (Paul et al., 2007). Patients
with the syndromic form of corpus callosum dysgenesis (a
callosal abnormality associated with other genetic syndromes
e.g., Aicardi syndrome) show severe developmental delay and
intellectual disabilities (Sztriha, 2005). Whereas individuals with
isolated AgCC (Symington et al., 2010), meaning they do
not have additional syndromes or disorders or evidence of
other brain pathology, typically only have mild behavioral and
cognitive problems (Moutard et al., 2003). However, the outcome
of isolated AgCC is often unclear because their intellectual
development can range from severely delayed to “perfectly
normal” (Paul et al., 2007).
Initial studies examining individuals diagnosed with AgCC
suggested impairments in their higher-order cognitive functions
and social interaction. Neuropsychological studies found
evidence for cognitive impairments in abstract reasoning
(Brown and Paul, 2000), problem solving, and processing speed
(Marco et al., 2012). These cognitive abilities become more
impaired as the task’s complexity increases (Brown and Paul,
2000). However, those with isolated AgCC do not show severe
general cognitive disabilities (Sauerwein et al., 1994) or language
impairments regarding naming, receptive language, and lexical
reading abilities (Brown and Paul, 2000). While deficits were
observed in linguistic pragmatics, AgCC sufferers have difficulty
understanding idioms, proverbs (Banich and Brown, 2000), and
narrative humor (Paul et al., 2003) as they tend to ignore the
second-order meaning of narratives or conversations.
Acallosal patients generally exhibit difficulties in social
cognition and social behavior, with adults showing impairment
in understanding others’ mental states (Symington et al., 2010)
and in recognizing emotions (Bridgman et al., 2014). The deficit
in emotion recognition seems to be directly associated with
atypical facial scanning; adults with AgCC spend less time in
the eye region while observing emotional expressions of others
(Bridgman et al., 2014), resulting in poorer detection of others’
emotional and mental states (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). The
social-cognitive impairment in AgCC was also demonstrated
by mild theory of mind (ToM) deficits (Symington et al.,
2010), poor social self-awareness (Brown and Paul, 2000), and
difficulties in social perspective taking (Symington et al., 2010;
Turk et al., 2010). Overall, the findings of social cognition
research suggest that AgCC patients have particular difficulties
understanding complex socio-emotional and life-like contexts of
everyday situations. These social cognitive impairments in people
with callosal agenesis overlap with the profile of autism spectrum
disorders (ASD). Individuals with ASD show similar patterns
of emotion recognition, being significantly worse at recognizing
emotions compared with normal controls, particularly when
only the eye region of faces is presented. There is also evidence
that AgCC individuals share the characteristic of impaired
social cognition with ASD patients, especially with respect to
the difficulties in recognizing another person’s mental states,
feelings, intentions, and goals. Survey studies, completed by
caregivers of children with AgCC, reported that a significant
number of children and adults have problems with social
behaviors (Badaruddin et al., 2007), and exhibit significant
autistic symptomatology (Moes et al., 2009; Lau et al., 2013).
To clarify the relationship between the autistic-like behavior
and callosal agenesis, a recent study (Paul et al., 2014) directly
compared AgCC adults with ASD adults. Using the Autism
Diagnostic Observation Schedule, they found that one third
of the adults with AgCC met the clinical criteria for autism,
whereas very few subjects were consistent with the ASD diagnosis
when developmental history was included. The autistic traits seen
in AgCC patients appear to emerge in differing time-courses,
depending on the age of the AgCC patient.
Despite the convergent evidence reviewed here, with regard
to social and cognitive deficits in AgCC, much work is still
needed. At present there are only a few studies that have
directly examined the mentalizing abilities in persons with
agenesis of the corpus callosum, and these have mainly been
case studies. In addition, even less research has been conducted
in children with AgCC that has specifically investigated the
developmental course of social-cognitive domains, including
emotion recognition and theory of mind. Previous studies
involving adults implicitly proposed that these impairments
are not likely to be exhibited in younger children with AgCC
(Paul et al., 2014), because normally, the corpus callosum is
not yet fully myelinated until adolescence (Giedd et al., 1996).
However, parent reported assessment studies have suggested
that children with AgCC are more likely to exhibit autistic
symptoms, including social-cognitive deficits, compared with
adults (Moes et al., 2009). Additionally, the specific social and
communicative abnormalities emerge early on, at about the
age of three, in ASD children who share important clinical
and neuroanatomical parallels with AgCC children. Therefore,
the social and cognitive deficits in emotion recognition and
mentalizing capacities are more likely to occur in childhood in
AgCC children. The present study addresses this issue in a sample
of 6–8 year old children with isolated AgCC. We chose this age
range because the social and higher-order cognitive functions
(theory of mind, understanding emotions, inhibitory control,
working memory), which are necessary for school readiness, are
available for typically developing children at this age.
The first aim of this study was to characterize the social
and higher-order cognitive functions in a sample of 18 children
diagnosed with isolated AgCC. In light of previous studies
examining social and cognitive functions in AgCC and ASD
individuals, we predicted that when given the task of recognizing
complex mental states from faces, children would perform
poorly; but would perform normally at recognizing basic
emotions. Additionally, we expected that AgCC children would
have more difficulty identifying mental states or emotions that
involved the eye region. We also hypothesized that children
with AgCC would have difficulties in inferring the mental states
of others, but this deficiency only becomes apparent in more
complex situations, when more information must be processed
and integrated. We expected that children would be more likely
to pass first-order false belief tasks, but would perform poorly in
second-order false belief tasks. Alternatively, the impaired social
cognitive function could reflect deficits in inhibitory control
and working memory. Here, we predicted that performance
of inhibitory control becomes more impaired in children with
AgCC relative to normally developing children, and the impaired
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executive functions makes a unique contribution to the ability of
theory of mind. In this study, we test the relative contributions
of inhibitory control, working memory, and assessment of
intelligence to AgCC children’s social abilities (ToM and emotion
- mental state recognition). Our second aim was to examine
the relationship between social cognition and the severity of
behavioral problems in children with and without corpus callous
agenesia. To answer these research questions, we employed
validated social cognitive tasks (emotion recognition, theory of
mind, executive function, and working memory), and parent-
reported assessments. Our study is the first comprehensive direct
comparison of AgCC children with typically developing children,
in cognitive and social domains.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants included 18 children with isolated corpus callosum
agenesia between the age of 6 and 8 years, and 18 normally
developing children as control (Table 1 shows the demographic
and psychological background information). Groups were
matched with respect to IQ, age, gender, children’s education,
and caregiver’s education. The two groups had exactly the
same number of males (14) and females (4), and they were
perfectly matched for age and education level; each child with
AgCC was individually paired to a typically developing child.
In the AgCC cohort, five were left-handed and four were
ambidextrous, while in the control group two were left-handed
and 16 were right-handed, with handedness being determined by
the administration of the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory. The
AgCC group included 16 with complete agenesis of the corpus
callosum and two with partial agenesis (we did not exclude two
children with partial AgCC because the individual connectivity
pattern and differences was beyond the scope of our study,
and previous studies also included both partial and complete
AgCC individuals, e.g., Lau et al., 2013; Paul et al., 2014). The
inclusion criteria for both groups were: 6–8 years of age, IQ
scores>75, nomajor head trauma or neurosurgery, no additional
genetic syndromes (e.g., Aicardi syndrome), and no severe
psychopathology (children with anxiety, ADHD, and children
undergoing psychotherapy treatment and/or taking psychotropic
medication were excluded). Regular and neuropsychological
examinations for all AgCC participants were conducted at the
Neurology Department of Obstetric and Gynecology Clinic
(Semmelweis University) in Budapest. The controls were
recruited from the local kindergarten and primary school.
Children with AgCC were first diagnosed before birth; the
absence of the corpus callous in utero was identified upon routine
high-resolution ultrasound, and, then a magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) scan confirmed the diagnosis. For all participants
with AgCC, previousMRI and radiological reports were gathered
to confirm the diagnosis of complete or partial AgCC by an
independent second neuroradiologist. Images were evaluated for
the presence and size of the corpus callosum, Probst bundle,
anterior commissure, white matter abnormalities, and cortical
malformations (e.g., subcortical heterotopia, polymicrogyria).
Participants with AgCC were included if they had structural







Mean (SD) 6.80 (0.84) 6.93 (0.76) t = −0.496 (p = 0.623)
Range 5.9–8.1 6.1–8.0
FSIQ
Mean (SD) 98.16 (8.79) 100.83 (6.48) t = −1.036 (p = 0.308)
Range 85–108 88–109
PIQ
Mean (SD) 94.66 (8.79) 98.33 (8.12) t = −1.081 (p = 0.287)
Range
VIQ
Mean (SD) 96.94 (14.00) 102.83 (7.74) t = −1.561 (p = 0.128)
Range
GENDER M: 14 F: 4 M: 14 F: 4 x2 = 0.0, (p = 1.0)
HANDEDNESS L: 5 R: 9 A:4 L: 2 R: 16 x2 = 7.246, (p = 0.02)
CHILDREN PRESCHOOL: PRESCHOOL: x2 = 0.0, (p = 1.0)
EDUCATION 10SCHOOL: 8 10 SCHOOL: 8
CAREGIVER EDUCATION
Mean (SD) 12.77 (2.36) 13.00 (2.11) t = −0.297 (p = 0.786)
Range 11.0–17.0 11.0–17.0
The comparison based on the t-test for age, FSIQ, PIQ, VIQ, caregiver education and x2
for gender, handedness and children education.
findings that commonly co-occur with AgCC: Probst Bundle,
colpocephaly, and interhemispheric cysts. Children with other
structural brain abnormalities (known genetic syndrome, frontal
lobe dysgenesis) were excluded. The presence of anterior
commissure was confirmed in all participants. The intelligence
scores, based on the Test of Wechsler Intelligence Scale
for Children - III (Hungarian standard version), were also
collected from previous neuropsychological records (assessed
within a year). Control participants’ intelligence scores were also
established using the Test of Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
Children -III.
The caregiver of each participant signed an informed consent.
All participants were treated in accordance with the Hungarian
Psychological Association Ethical Codes. This study was carried
out in accordance with the recommendations of Psychology
Research Guidelines of the Ethical Committee of the Hungarian
Psychological Association, with written informed consent from




To assess ToM, we used two classic False Belief Tasks with
some modification to test AgCC children’s ability to understand
others’ mind. The first-order false belief task was the traditional
The Smarties tube test (Perner et al., 1989). The task involves
a familiar Smarties box, but filled with pencils instead of
candies. The experimenter first asks the child “What do you
think is in this box?,” and the child naturally replies “Candies,”
because they have an expectation of what is in the box (false
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belief). The child is then shown the pencils inside the box.
Then the experimenter closes the lid of the box and asks
the child two belief questions. The first question is “When I
first showed you this box what did you think was inside?,” and
the second question is “What will your mother (who did not
see the pencils) think is inside the box?” If the child has a
theory of mind, they will realize that their mother would also
think candies are inside, and a normal 4-year-old child mostly
answers “Candies,” by referring the other’s false belief, but 3-
year-old children or children with impaired ToM usually reply
“pencils.”
The second-order false belief task was a modification of
the Sally-Anne test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). In the original
task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) the child is introduced to two
dolls, Sally and Anne, who are playing with a marble. The
dolls put the marble in a basket then Sally leaves the scene.
Anne takes the marble out of the basket and she puts it away
in a different container. When Sally returns the child is asked
“Where will Sally search for the marble?” The child fails the
theory of mind task if she answers that Sally will search for
it in the second container. The second-order modification of
the Sally-Anne task is that when Sally leaves, she looks back
through the key-hole while Anne is transferring the marble
to the new location. When Sally returns, the test question is
no longer “Where will Sally search for the marble?,” instead it
is “Where does Anne think Sally will search for the marble?”
We used this modification of the Sally-Anne Task to test the
children’s second-order theory of mind ability. Children were
successful if they responded correctly to both the test and
control questions. These tasks were scored as pass = 1, fail
= 0. Performance across the two tasks was summed (range
0–2) to create a single indicator of false belief understanding.
Additionally, we also analyzed each test individually as the
indicator of first-order false belief test and second-order false
belief test.
Emotion and Mental State Recognition
We administered the Faces Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) to
measure the emotion and mental state recognition of children.
The Faces Test consists of 20 photographs of an actress posing,
10 photos of basic emotions (happy, sad, angry, afraid, disgust,
distress, surprise), and 10 photos of complex mental states
(scheme, guilt, admire, interest, thoughtfulness, quizzical, bored,
arrogant, flirting, quizzical). In our experiment, under each
photo, two words were typed, but only one described the
target basic emotion or mental state the actress was posing.
Subjects were presented with 20 photos (10 basic emotions and
10 complex mental states) separately in a random order. For
each photo, the experimenter read the two words under the
photo, and the child was asked to choose the emotion/mental
state that best described what the person was thinking or
feeling in the picture. Each trial was scored as pass = 1,
fail = 0. The dependent measure was the number of correct
answers for basic emotions and for complex mental states.
Performance across the two conditions was summed (range 0–
20) to create a single indicator of emotion and mental state
recognition.
Executive Function
Two executive function tasks were administered, providing
measures of inhibitory control (Day and Night Stroop), and
working memory (Digit Span forward and backward).
For working memory, we administered the standardWechsler
Digit Span Task to measure the working memory capacity. This
test requires the examiner to verbally present digits at a rate
of one per second, and children are asked to repeat the digits
verbatim in the same order (forward test). The backward test
requires the participant to repeat the digits in reverse order.
The number of digits increases by one until the participant
consecutively fails two trials of the same digit span length. The
task was preceded by a brief training procedure. Two practice
items preceded the experimental trials, and the task was only
started if the child passed the practice trials. Children were
administered two different trials of each sequence length, which
ranged from two to nine.
To measure inhibitory control, the Day and Night Stroop
task (Gerstadt et al., 1994) was used to assess executive function
measurement of interference control in young children. Children
were instructed to say the word “night” when they saw a white
sun card and to say “day” when shown a black moon card.
We used two conditions, an Incongruent Condition to test the
ability of inhibition and a Congruent Condition as a control. In
the Incongruent Condition, children were required to say the
opposite of what was shown on the day-night cards, maintain
the task instructions over the procedure, and inhibit a dominant
response associated directly to the stimulus while executing the
subdominant response. In the Congruent condition, children
simply said what the stimulus represented. The order of the
conditions was counterbalanced across participants, for half of
the participants, the experiment started with the presentation of
Congruent Condition, while for the other half of the participants
the Incongruent Condition was conducted. The participant did
four practice trials. In each condition 16 trials were administered,
in which eight night cards and eight day cards were shown in a
pseudo-random order (n(ight), d(ay), n, d, d, n, d, n, n, d, d, n, d,
n, n, d, n, d). No feedback was given to the children. The task was
presented on a computer screen and was controlled by PsychoPy,
presenting the stimuli and recording the participants’ responses.
The dependent measure was the total number of correct answers
for each condition. Response latency was not measured because
most of the children were unable to correctly use the response
panel.
Behavior Questionnaire
We used the validated Hungarian version of the extended
Strength and Difficulty Questionnaire (Goodman, 1997, 1999,
SDQ) to measure the children’s emotional and behavioral
difficulties. The SDQ was administered by parents and covers the
major areas of emotional and behavioral difficulties, and predicts
psychiatric disorders. The SDQ consists of 25 items, divided
into five subscales: the prosocial subscale, the inattention-
hyperactivity subscale, the emotional symptoms subscale, the
conduct problems subscale, and the peer problems subscale. Each
item can be scored “not true,” “somewhat true,” or “certainly
true.” The extended version includes questions that ask whether
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the respondent considers the young person to have a problem and
its impact on their social emotional life. All subscales expecting
pro-social behavior are summed to compute a total difficulties
score. The dependent variables taken from the SDQ include the
total score of difficulties and five subscale scores. The SDQ is
available on the internet website: www.sdqinfo.com.
Procedure
Subjects were tested individually in a quiet room, at the clinic
of Semmelweis University for AgCC children, and at the local
primary school for control children. All children were tested
in a single session for the target tasks, the control children
completed the intelligence test in a separate session. Intelligence
was assessed in the AgCC children prior to the study, by a
neuropsychologist during a regular yearly visit. On arrival, the
child was asked to be seated at the table, then the experimenter
explained that they were going to play some “games.” Prior
to each test, participants were trained on how to do the task.
Parents received a child behavior questionnaire and were asked to
complete the questionnaires and return them. All children were
administered individually over two separate sessions, and there
was no time limit.
Data Analysis
All statistical analyses were conducted using IMB SPSS Statistics
(Version 22.0). We used an independent t-test and chi2 test
to examine the group differences between the AgCC group
and control group for social-cognitive factors and behavioral
problems. We then computed correlations (Pearson’s r) to test
our prediction that social-cognitive abilities would be associated
with behavioral symptoms. We used a significance level of 0.05
(two-tailed) for all tests.
RESULTS
Theory of Mind
First, we evaluated the control questions (reality and memory)
of the false belief tasks, and only those subjects who passed
the control questions were included in the present analysis.
One AgCC child was excluded from the analysis due to failing
the control questions. We compared the performance of AgCC
children with control children for on each false belief test using
chi2 test. The proportion of subjects in the AgCC group who
passed either the first-order false belief task [Smarties tube test,
x2(35) = 7.098, 1df, p = 0.00], or the second-order false belief
task [modified Sally-Anne false belief task, x2(35) = 3.736, 1df, p
= 0.05] was significantly smaller than that of the control group.
Finally, the Mann-Whitney non-parametric test confirmed that
children with AgCC performed poorer, with lower total scores
on the ToM tasks [z(35) = −2.612, p = 0.009]. Table 2 shows
numbers of children who passed the Smarties or Sally-Anne M
false belief tasks.
Additional analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted
in order to investigate the effect of verbal intelligence on false
belief performance. When VIQ was applied as a covariate in
ANCOVA, it indicated that false belief scores were significantly
poorer for the AgCC group [F(1, 32) = 6.42, p= 0.01, ηp
2
= 0.01].
TABLE 2 | Number of subjects in each group who passed on Smarties or
Sally Anne M belief tasks (an AgCC child did not pass the control
questions).
AgCC (N = 17) Control (N = 18) Total (N = 35)
Smarties 8 16 24
Sally Anne M 4 10 14
FIGURE 1 | Emotion recognition and mental state recognition mean
accuracy by group. Error bars represent standard error.
ANCOVA shows that the main effect of verbal ability (VIQ) on
false belief performance was not significant [F(1, 32) = 2.90, p =
0.09, ηp2 = 0.08].
Emotion and Mental State Recognition
First, we compared the performance on recognition of basic
emotions and complex mental states in AgCC and control
subjects. The AgCC group were less accurate than the control
group on overall Faces scores [for total scores t(35) = −3.483,
p = 0.001, d = 1.16]. Subjects with AgCC showed poorer
performance (M = 12.83, SD = 3.05) on selecting the target
emotional and mental states compared with the control children
(M = 15.55, SD = 1.29). Repeated measures of ANOVA,
comparing group (AgCC vs. control) and complexity of mental
states factor (basic vs. complex), revealed a significant group
effect [F(1, 34) = 12.13, p = 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.26], indicating that
children with AgCC were less accurate than control subjects. A
significant difference was also found for complexity of mental
states factor [F(1, 34) = 15.93, p = 0.00, ηp
2
= 0.31]; children
recognized the basic emotional mental states more accurately
than complex mental states in both groups. The group ×
complexity interaction was not significant [F(1, 34) = 1.602, p =
0.21, ηp2 = 0.045] for complexity and group factors. The mean
scores (Figure 1) indicate that subjects with AgCC performed less
accurately on both basic emotion trials (M= 7.16, SD= 1.65) and
complex mental state recognition trials (M = 5.66, SD = 1.87)
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Picture 1: Happy vs. Surprise 18 18 0.0
Picture 2: Afraid vs. Angry 13 17 3.200
Picture 3: Surprise vs. Happy 17 18 1.029
Picture 4: Disgust vs. Sad 14 18 4.500*
Picture 5: Sad vs. Disgust 15 17 1.125
Picture 6: Angry vs. Afraid 10 9 0,111
Picture 7: Surprise vs. Happy 9 9 0.0
Picture 8: Distress vs. Sad 11 10 1.114
Picture 9: Happy vs. Surprise 15 16 0.232
Picture 10: Angry vs. Afraid 7 15 7.481**
COMPLEX MENTAL STATES
Picture 11: Scheming vs. Arrogant 5 12 5.461*
Picture 12: Guilt vs. Arrogant 10 16 4.985*
Picture 13: Thoughtful vs. Arrogant 13 17 3.200
Picture 14: Admiring vs. Surprise 15 16 0.232
Picture 15: Quizzical vs. Guilt 11 10 0.114
Picture 16: Playful vs. Happy 13 11 0.500
Picture 17: Bored vs. Sleepy 10 11 0.114
Picture 18: Interested vs. Disinterested 9 16 6.415*
Picture 19: Interested vs. Disinterested 5 12 5.461*
Picture 20: Arrogant vs. Guilt 11 11 0.0
The first term is the target (correct) term. The position of the target term and the order of
the picture pairs were randomized. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
compared with the control children (for basic emotion:M= 8.16,
SD=1.04, and for complex mental states:M = 7.38, SD= 1.29).
Table 3 shows the number of children choosing the correct
basic emotion or complex mental state for each trial. Using
chi2 test to compare the performance of AgCC individuals
and control subjects on each trial, the analysis revealed that
there was a significant difference between the AgCC group and
control group, but only on the “angry vs. afraid” and “sad vs.
disgust” trials in the basic emotion trials. As for the trials of the
complex mental states, children with AgCC were significantly
less accurate on the trials of the “guilt vs. arrogant,” “interest




The independent sample t-test results showed no significant
effect for the forward digit span (p = ns.), or for the backward
digit span (p= ns.).
Inhibitory Control
A 2 groups (AgCC vs. control) × 2 conditions (congruent
vs. incongruent) mixed model ANOVA was conducted for
performance (correct response rate). The analysis of performance
showed a significant main effect for the condition [F(1, 30) =
FIGURE 2 | Day and night Strop accuracy performance separated by
group and congruency. Error bars represent standard error.
65.29, p = 0.000, ηp2 = 0.684], and for the group [F(1, 30) =
36.39, p = 0.000, ηp2 = 0.548], and for the interaction between
group and condition [F(1, 30) = 33.61, p = 0.000, ηp
2
= 0.527].
The results demonstrate that Stroop-like interference is higher
in children with AgCC (M = 14.0, SD = 0.41) compared
with control children (M = 17.35, SD = 0.46), regarding the
performance (Figure 2).
Relationship between Social and Cognitive
Factors
We computed additional correlational analysis for both groups
separately to determine correlations between social and cognitive
factors (Table 4). Within the AgCC group, there was a medium
strength correlation between forward digit span and basic
emotion recognition, as well as between backward digit span
and complex mental state recognition and inhibitory controls,
with significant correlation coefficients ranging from r = 0.41
to r = 0.62, p < 0.05. For the inhibitory control measures,
there was no significant correlation with social factors (false
belief and emotion and mental state recognition). Similarly,
intelligence factors (general IQ, verbal IQ, and non-verbal
IQ) also showed no significant correlation with social and
cognitive factors (theory of mind, emotions, and mental state
recognition, inhibitory control and working memory). For
the control group, significant correlations were only found
between backward digit span and false belief [r(18) = 0.51, p =
0.03].
Behavioral Questionnaire
We compared differences in behavioral, emotional and
relationship problems between the two groups using independent
sample t-test, and computed Cohen’s d effect size. Comparison
of the SDQ subscale scores and the total difficulties revealed that
children with AgCC had significantly higher mean scores (p <
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TABLE 4 | Correlation r between social factors and behavioral problems measures separately for each group (AgCC Group/Control Group).
Control AgCC
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
1. False belief 1 0.22 0.49* 0.31 0.14 0.20 0.18
2. FACES BE −0.12 1 0.49* 0.84 0.22 0.46* 0.37
3. FACES MS 0.17 −0.22 1 0.88** 0.35 0.42 0.52*
4. FACES Total 0.04 0.62** 0.61** 1 0.35 0.51* 0.52*
5. Day-Night 0.46 −0.10 −0.28 −0.31 1 0.44 0.62*
6. Digit Span FW 0.51* 0.06 0.21 0.22 −0.06 1 0.77**
7. Digit Span BW 0.16 0.26 −0.23 0.22 0.14 0.2 1
False belief, FACES BE, Basic Emotion recognition, FACES MS Mental States, FACES Total, Day-night, Day and Night Stroop, Digit Span Forward, Digit Span Backward **p < 0.001,
*p < 0.05.








Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Emotional problems 4.61 (1.50) 2.00 (1.23) 1.90 5.69**
Conduct problems 3.27 (1.31) 1.50 (1.15) 1.43 4.38**
Inattention-hyperactivity 4.00 (2.27) 3.72 (1.77) 0.13 0.40
Peer problems 3.16 (1.88) 1.88 (1.28) 0.79 4.64**
Prosocial behavior 5.47 (2.03) 8.69 (1.46) 1.81 −6.52**
Total difficulties 15.05 (5.17) 7.88 (3.17) 1.67 5.00**
Number of children (N), SDQ mean scores, standard deviations (SD) and effect sizes for
SDQ (sub) scales and t-test values.
Statistical significance of differences between children with and without AgCC (t-test):
**p < 0.001.
0.001) on the total difficulties scale, and on all subscales, expect
for the inattention-hyperactivity subscale (p = ns.). Table 5
shows the mean scores and Cohen’s d effect size values in the
AgCC cohort (Figure 3).
Relationships between Social-Cognitive
Factors and Behavioral Problems
We carried out further correlational analysis for each group
separately to determine correlations between social and cognitive
factors, and the severity of behavioral problems. The analysis
involved the following factors: ToM ability (the total score of
false belief tasks), emotion and mental state recognition (Faces:
basic emotion recognition, complex mental states recognition,
and Faces total score), and executive function (inhibitory control:
Day and Night Stroop incongruent condition, working memory:
digit span forward and digit span backward). The relationship
of social cognitive factors to behavioral problems was examined
separately for each SDQ subscale (Table 6). The AgCC group
revealed a borderline significant correlation between ToM and
the SDQ Peer Problems subscale [r(17) = −0.45, p = 0.06], and
the Prosocial subscale marginally correlated with ToM [r(17) =
0.46, p = 0.06], complex mental state recognition [r(18) = 0.42,
p = 0.08], and inhibitory control [r(15) = 0.48, p = 0.06]. In
the control group, a significant correlation was found between
complex mental state and the SDQ Inattention-hyperactivity
subscale [r(17) = −0.51, p = 0.03], and digit span backward
and SDQ Conduct problems subscale [r(17) = −0.49, p =
0.03].
We used a value of z (Weaver and Wuensch, 2013)
that can be applied to assess the difference between two
correlation coefficients of the AgCC group and control group.
We computed z-tests for each pair of correlations. The z-
test results showed that the observed correlations did not
differ from one another between two groups (z coefficients
ranged from z = −1.08 to z = 1.66, p = ns.), except for
the relationship between Hyperactivity-inattention subscale and
complex mental state recognition (z = −1.98 p = 0.02).
This finding indicates that the relationship between social
cognition and the severity of behavioral problems in children
with and without AgCC does not differ significantly. This
means that typically developing children and AgCC children
represent the two endpoints of the same scale. Control children
showed fewer behavioral difficulties, with good performance in
social and cognitive tasks, while AgCC children showed more
behavioral difficulties associated with weaker cognitive and social
abilities.
DISCUSSION
In order to provide evidence to clarify the role of the corpus
callosum, regarding the nature of understanding others’ mind, we
investigated the main socio-emotional and cognitive functions
in a group of children with isolated AgCC. We administered
theory of mind tasks, emotion/mental state recognition,
executive measures, and a parent-reported behavioral problems
questionnaire. The findings of the present study are in line
with previous studies showing typical mild social cognitive
impairments in individuals with AgCC, even in childhood.
On the theory of mind tasks, children with AgCC performed
significantly poorer than age- and IQ-matched controls. AgCC
children performed poorly on both false belief tasks, with only
half of the AgCC children passing the first-order-false belief task
compared with 89 percent of control children. Only 23% of AgCC
children passed the second-order false belief task compared
with 55% of normally developing children in our sample. These
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FIGURE 3 | Parent rating on Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire. Mean scores for parent rating scales including (A) Emotional problems, (B) Conduct
problems, (C) Inattention-Hyperactivity, (D) Peer problems, (E) Prosocial behavior, and (F) Total difficulties. Higher scores indicate greater symptomatology. Error bars
represent standard deviation.
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TABLE 6 | Correlation r between social factors and behavioral problems measures for the whole sample and for separately for each group (AgCC
Group/Control Group).
SDQ
Emotional problems Conduct problems Inattention-hyperactivity Peer problems Prosocial behavior Total difficulties
False Belief −0.47** (−0.22/−0.23) −0.37 (−0.11/−0.08) −0.03 (0.22/−0.31) −0.55** (−0.45/−0.24) 0.57** (0.48/0.34) −0.47* (−0.17/−0.39)
FACES BE −0.26 (−0.04/0.01) −0.25 (−0.08/−0.02) −0.05 (−0.09/0.09) −0.32* (−0.07/−0.30) 0.29 (0.16/−0.09) −0.16 (−0.14/−0.08)
FACES SE −0.36** (0.35/−0.13) −0.12 (0.27/0.22) −0.06 (0.16/−0.51*) −0.40** (−0.19/0.01) 0.58** (0.43/0.23) −0.33* (0.81/−0.25)
FACES Total −0.36** (−0.02/0.11) −0.21 (0.12/0.15) −0.01 (0.05/−0.33) −0.44** (−0.16/−0.23) 0.52** (0.34/0.11) −0.34** (−0.07/−0.27)
Day-Night −0.39* (−0.36/0.01) −0.47** (−0.18/−0.02) −0.01 (−0.08/0.28) −0.46** (−0.18/0.11) 0.71** (0.48/0.19) −0.43* (−0.05/0.20)
Digit Span FW −0.04 (−0.24/0.08) −0.13 (−0.28/0.08) −0.17 (−0.15/−0.30) −0.05 (−0.26/0.01) −0.08 (−0.03/0.04) −0.09 (−0.21/−0.25)
Digit Span BW −0.22 (−0.31/−0.05) −0.13 (−0.07/−0.49*) −0.05 (−0.22/0.17) −0.05 (−0.03/0.04) 0.21 (0.06/0.22) −0.16 (0.14/0.14)
False belief, FACES BE, Basic Emotion recognition, FACES SE, Social emotion recognition, FACES Total, Day-night, Day and Night Stroop, Digit Span Forward, Digit Span Backward
**p < 0.001, *p < 0.05.
findings suggest that children with AgCC have an increased
risk of having problems in understanding other people’s mind.
Similar deficits in theory of mind are known from findings in
children with autism. They typically fail the false belief task
(e.g., Smarties Tube Task or Sally Anne task), while 4-year-
old normally developing children, or even children with Down
syndrome, are able to pass it. A previous study with AgCC adults
(Symington et al., 2010) also found mild theory of mind deficits
in various mentalizing tasks, such as understanding sarcasm and
interpreting visual and textual social cues. However, this study
has not reported serious deficits in specific theory of mind tasks
that required mental state attribution (Faux Pas Test and Happé
Theory of Mind Stories). A more recent study (Paul et al., 2014),
directly comparing the social functions in an AgCC group and an
ASD group, reported that AgCC adults had higher empathizing
scores than ASD adults. These findings together indicate that
individuals with AgCC have difficulties in understanding others’
mental state, and they share some impaired social cognition
with ASD persons, but AgCC individuals seem to have better
mentalizing capacities. Our findings support this conclusion;
children between the age of 6 and 8 years with callosal dysgenesis
also indicated developmental delay in standard ToM tasks, but
their performance showed high variability, ranging from severely
impaired to “perfectly normal,” and their ToM performance
was not associated with intelligence factors or any executive
functions.
With respect to emotional and mental state understanding
(Faces Test, Baron-Cohen et al., 1997), children with AgCC had
fewer difficulties recognizing basic emotions from photographed
facial expressions; they only showed some deficits on negative
emotion trials (angry-fear and disgust-sad distinctions). In
contrast, the AgCC children showed more deficits in recognizing
complex mental states compared to the control children. In
particular, AgCC children failed to identify expressions that
depicted a specific mental state (interest vs. disinterest), or a
complex social emotion (scheming vs. arrogant, and guilt vs.
arrogant). Similar impaired recognition of emotions has been
shown in previous studies, which examined social-emotional
abilities in clinical samples. Individuals with schizophrenia have
difficulties recognizing emotion expression of disgust (Bediou
et al., 2005), anger (Gogharie and Sponheim, 2013), fear, and
surprise (Barkl et al., 2014). While individuals with autism often
fail to recognize fear and anger, they tend tomislabel anger as fear
(Pelphrey et al., 2002). Additionally, the impaired recognition
of complex mental states is more well-known in subjects with
autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). A prior study with AgCC
subjects (Bridgman et al., 2014) found similar patterns of emotion
recognition. AgCC individuals also had difficulties in recognizing
fearful expressions and they often mislabelled anger as disgust or
sadness, and fear as surprise. Individuals with callosal dygenesis
also showed atypical face perception, including reduced gaze to
the eyes and increased focus on the mouth. In line with this
evidence, the present findings indicate that children with AgCC
are able to identifymost of the primary emotions, however, AgCC
children have some difficulties in detecting a complex mental
state from facial expressions, particularly those expressions that
require processing information from the eyes (e.g., interest, guilt,
arrogance, scheming). This finding supports the idea that AgCC
and ADS individuals share some impairment in social cognition.
The executive functions in AgCC children showed a
normal range of working memory abilities, but difficulties in
performance of inhibitory control; the Stroop-like interference
was higher than the performance of control children. Executive
functions are a set of higher-order cognitive skills that depend
upon specific callosal connectivity. A comprehensive study
(Marco et al., 2012) directly investigating the executive functions
in an AgCC cohort also found impairments in inhibition and
flexibility tasks, but the performance in executive tests was
attributed to slow cognitive processing. In contrast, Brown et al.
(2001) found evidence that individuals with AgCC have normal
executive functions with respect to the inhibition/flexibility
skills. They speculated that the presence of other cerebral
commissures in AgCC allow for the interhemispheric transfer
of information in inhibitory control tasks. The inconsistency of
findings, probably comes from the high variability of difficulty
levels in test batteries that were used. It is likely that AgCC
individuals exhibit more errors and slower processing speed
when the information is more complex and less easily encoded.
Our findings also showed that children without the corpus
callosum committed more errors in interference tasks. Response
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time was not measured reliably in our study; therefore, we have
no information on whether this performance is a consequence of
processing speed when the nervous system uses the alternative
routes connecting the hemispheres.
Taken together, findings presented here support several
potential explanations that may account for the impaired social
cognition in children with AgCC. First, the language explanation
suggests that the impaired social function is mediated by the
decreased capacity in linguistic pragmatics. Previous findings of
linguistic studies have also suggested that AgCC patients tend to
use the literal meaning of the narrative information and ignore
the second-order meaning of narratives or conversations. It is
possible that children with AgCC have trouble understanding
the false belief tasks because they do not understand different
perspectives in the context of ToM tasks required to describe
the world linguistically. Additionally, AgCC individuals tend to
use fewer “mentalizing words” (Symington et al., 2010), that
reflect others’ mental states (“know,” “think,” “feel”), resulting
in deficits that infer mental and emotional processes of others.
The lack of callosal interconnectivity may support the decreased
capacity in linguistic pragmatics, as the callosal dysgenesis
reduces the accessibility to the more complex integration
of the semantic network, which is widespread in the two
hemispheres. According to the second explanation, executive
functioning is also a potential candidate for mediating impaired
social cognition in AgCC patients. The absence of callosal
connections in AgCC functional brain connectivity seems to
be more limited during tasks that require complex cognitive
operation, such as inhibitory control, working memory, and
flexible switching. A previous brain imaging study (Hinkley et al.,
2012) demonstrated that impairment of functional interaction
appears in regions in the frontal, parietal, and occipital cortices,
which indicated social-cognitive functions, known to be impaired
in AgCC patients. Indeed, performance in executive function
(Tower of London task) directly correlated with resting-state
functional connectivity of dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex in
individuals with AgCC (Hinkley et al., 2012). Our findings,
however, do not support that executive functions, namely
the inhibitory control, reflect the impaired social cognitive
function, like theory of mind and mental state recognition.
A third possible explanation is the deficit in the process of
integration of multiple sources of information. AgCC patients
have difficulties using the context of a complex situation to
interpret the meaning of linguistic information, and inferring the
mental states of other persons based on the available, simpler
information. The absence of the corpus callosum disrupts the
interhemispheric connection and limits the size of the functional
processing network of complex social cognitive functions.
However, individuals with complete AgCC do not experience
disconnection syndrome, they exhibit a limited amount of
interhemispheric transfers, mediated by anterior commissure
and additional alternative anatomical tracts, developed in AgCC
subjects, such as Probst and heterotopic bundles, providing
compensatory mechanisms for social cognitive processes (Marco
et al., 2012). However, these alternative connections cannot
compensate fully for the complex function of the corpus
callosum, and results in a slower processing speed. Moreover,
the lacking interhemispheric connection leads to an alteration
in intrahemispheric connectivity that increases the likelihood
of other cognitive deficits. Other developmental disorders, such
as ASD, ADHD, and schizophrenia also demonstrated reduced
callosal size that contributed to impairments in interhemispheric
transfer and processing speed (Paul et al., 2007).
The secondary aim of this study was to investigate whether
difficulties in social cognition and/or executive functioning are
related to the severity of behavioral problems, and whether they
increase the prevalence of emotional- and social problems in
children with AgCC. Mental health problems were assessed by
the Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire, which had never
been used before in a sample of children with AgCC. Using
parent-administered questionnaires, we found that children with
AgCC had more problems with all domains (behavior, emotions,
prosocial behavior, and relationship), except the inattention-
hyperactivity domain, compared with control subjects. However,
the lack of differences in the Inattention-Hyperactivity subscale
can be explained by the fact that there were three children
in the control group who also reached the cut-off score on
the Inattention-Hyperactivity subscale. The results of the SDQ
indicate that the functional changes in brain connectivity might
contribute to behavioral problems in childhood, as several
previous studies reported mild to severe behavioral anomalies
in AgCC individuals, with the most frequently mentioned
disorders being autism and attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD) (Paul et al., 2007). The abnormal development
of connectivity during childhood is likely to mediate the
reduced capacity in complex social cognitive processes, which
may contribute to the symptoms of behavioral problems or
early onset of psychiatric disorders. The findings within the
AgCC group demonstrated that the deficits in social cognitive
skills are only marginally correlated with behavioral problems.
AgCC children show mild dysfunction in three domains of
mental state recognition, theory of mind, and executive function
(inhibitory control), and these dysfunctions are associated with
behavioral problems. It seems that the peer problems and
prosocial behaviors are linked to mentalizing capacity (false
belief and complex mental state) and inhibitory control, and the
complemental state recognition and inhibitory control are related
to the Prosocial behavior subscale. Children who lack the capacity
for understanding others’ mind have more problems in social
domains.
One of the limitations of this study the relatively small size of
sample, which might have prevented findings the hypothesized
correlation between the socio-cognitive factors the behavioral
adjustment. Another limitation of our findings are that the
AgCC cohort involved children with partial corpus callosum
agenesis (pAgCC), whose behavioral performance did not differ
from the complete AgCC, but the different brain condition
might predict variable social-cognitive performance. Previous
studies showed that the residual fibers of the callosum of
pAgCC probably provide higher variability in the pattern of
interhemispheric connectivity (Wahl et al., 2009), increasing
the variability of the behavioral and cognitive outcome. Further
study is necessary in order to understand how the compensatory
anatomical changes and residual callosal tracts contribute to the
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 94
Lábadi and Beke Mental State Understanding in AgCC
social and cognitive functioning. It may be more informative
to investigate the emerging social cognitive performance and
mapping of the developmental tracts assessed with MR and DTi
imaging techniques, in parallel.
In conclusion, this study demonstrated that there are mild
deficits in mental state understanding, executive functions,
and behavior symptoms in children with AgCC. The findings
indicate that dysgenesis of the corpus callosum constitutes a
specific risk factor for developing social cognitive symptoms.
AgCC individuals tend to misconstrue social information and
misunderstand the mental states of others within complex
social contexts, including problems with emotion recognition
and complex mental state recognition, theory of mind, and
inhibitory control. The absence of the corpus callosum seems
to affect the development of behavioral characteristics and cause
specific behavioral anomalies. Taken together, evidence from
previous studies with AgCC patients suggest that social cognitive
impairments may relate to the missing corpus callosum. The
callosal agenesis results in deficiencies in imagining and inferring
the mental, emotional, and social functioning of others. This
pattern of cognitive and social deficits has been labeled as primary
AgCC syndrome, by Symington et al. (2010) for that condition,
when there is callosal absence without evidence of other brain
pathology or the observable cognitive and social impairments
primarily related to the absence of the corpus callosum. The
primary AgCC syndrome profile includes impaired emotion
recognition, restricted verbal interpretation of social scenes,
and emotional experiences, as well as mild deficits in theory
of mind. The lack of callosal interconnectivity might explain
the decreased capacity in the higher-order cognitive domain,
as the callosal dysgenesis reduces the accessibility to the more
complex integration of social networks, which is widespread in
the two hemispheres. In AgCC individuals it is likely that the
functions involved are those that are hemispherically lateralized
(emotions, language, visuospatial processing), or the complex
social functions, in which the information is spatially distributed
between the two hemispheres. If the development of the corpus
callosum is impaired, the normal interaction and competition
between the hemispheres is abolished, resulting an alternative
routes in the adult brain.
INFORMED CONSENT
Written informed consent was obtained from patients who
participated in this study.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
BL as an author contributed to the following tasks during
the preparation of this manuscript: planning research method,
collecting and analyzing data, writing the manuscript. AB
as an author contributed to the following tasks during the
preparation of this manuscript: planning research, examining
children concerning the medical conditions, analyzing data and
writing manuscript.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was supported by OTKA (PD-109597) research
grant.
REFERENCES
Badaruddin, D. H., Andrews, G. L., Bölte, S., Schilmoeller, K. J., Schilmoeller,
G., Paul, L. K., et al. (2007). Social and behavioral problems of children with
agenesis of the corpus callosum. Child Psychiatry Hum. Dev. 38, 287–302.
doi: 10.1007/s10578-007-0065-6
Banich, M. T., and Brown, W. S. (2000). A life-span perspective on
interaction between the cerebral hemispheres. Dev. Neuropsychol. 18, 1–10.
doi: 10.1207/S15326942DN1801_1
Barkl, S. J., Lah, S., Harris, A. W., and Williams, L. M. (2014). Facial
emotion identification in early-onset and first-episode psychosis: a
systematic review with meta-analysis. Schizophr. Res. 159, 62–69.
doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2014.07.049
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., and Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a
‘theory of mind’? Cognition 21, 37–46.
Baron-Cohen, S., O’Riordan, M., Stone, V., Jones, R., and Plaisted, K. (1999).
Recognition of Faux Pas by normally developing children and children with
Asperger Syndrome or high-functioning autism. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 29,
407–418.
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., and Jolliffe, T. (1997). Is there a “Language of
the Eyes”? evidence from normal adults, and adults with autism or asperger
syndrome. Vis. Cogn. 4, 311–331.
Bedeschi, M. F., Bonaglia, M. C., Grasso, R., Pellegri, A., Garghentino, R.
R., Battaglia, M. A., et al. (2006). Agenesis of the corpus callous:clinical
and genetic study in 63 young patients. Pediatr. Neurol. 34, 186–193.
doi: 10.1016/j.pediatrneurol.2005.08.008
Bediou, B., Franck, N., Saoud, M., Baudouin, J. Y., Tiberghien, G.,
Daléry, J., et al. (2005). Effects of emotion and identity on facial
affect processing in schizophrenia. Psychiatry Res. 133, 149–157.
doi: 10.1016/j.psychres.2004.08.008
Bodensteiner, J., Schaefer, G. B., Breeding, L., and Cowan, L. (1994). Hypoplasia
of the corpus callous: a study of 445 consecutive MRI scans. J. Child Neurol. 9,
47–49.
Bridgman,M.W., Brown,W. S., Spezio,M. L., Leonard,M. K., Adolphs, R., Paul, L.
P., et al. (2014). Facial emotion recognition in agenesis of the corpus callosum.
J. Neurodev. Disord. 6:32. doi: 10.1186/1866-1955-6-32
Brown, S. W., Thrasher, E. D., and Paul, L. K. (2001). Interhemispheric stroop
effects in partial and complete agenesis of the corpus callosum. J. Int.
Neuropsychol. Soc. 7, 302–311. doi: 10.1017/S1355617701733048
Brown, W. S., and Paul, L. K. (2000). Psychosocial deficits in agenesis of
the corpus callosum with normal intelligence. Cogn. Neuropsyc. 5, 135–157.
doi: 10.1080/135468000395781
Gerstadt, C. L., Hong, Y. J., and Diamond, A. (1994). The relationship between
cognition and action: performance of children 31/2 and 7 years old on a
Stroop-like day-night test. Cognition 53, 129–153.
Giedd, J. N., Rumsey, J. M., Castallanos, F. X., Rajapakse, J. C., Kaysen, D.,
Vaituzis, A. C., et al. (1996). A quantitative MRI study of the corpus
callosum in children and adolescents. Brain Res. Dev. Brain Res. 91, 274–280.
doi: 10.1016/0165-3806(95)00193-X
Glass, H. C., Shaw, G. M., Ma, C., and Sherr, E. H. (2008). Agenesis of the corpus
callosum in California 1983-2003: a population-based study.Am. J. Med. Genet.
A. 146A, 2495–2500. doi: 10.1002/ajmg.a.32418
Gogharie, V. M., and Sponheim, S. R. (2013). More pronounced deficits
in facial emotion recognition for schizophrenia than bipolar disorder.
Compr. Psychiatry. 54, 388–397. doi: 10.1016/j.comppsych.2012.
10.012
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 94
Lábadi and Beke Mental State Understanding in AgCC
Goodman, R. (1997). The Strengths andDifficulties Questionnaire: a research note.
J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 38, 581–586.
Goodman, R. (1999). The extended version of the Strengths and Difficulties
Questionnaire as a guide to child psychiatric caseness and consequent burden.
J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 40, 791–801.
Hinkley, L. B., Marco, E. J., Findlay, A. M., Honma, S., Jeremy, R. J.,
Strominger, Z., et al. (2012). The role of corpus callosum development
in functional connectivity and cognitive processing. PLoS ONE 7:e39804.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0039804
Lau, Y. C., Hinkley, L. B. N., Bukshpun, P., Strominger, Z. A., Wakahiro,
M. L. J., Baron-Cohen, S., et al. (2013). Autism traits in individuals with
agenesis of the corpus callosum. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 43, 5 1106–1118.
doi: 10.1007/s10803-012-1653-2
Marco, E. J., Harrell, K. M., Brown, W. S., Hill, S. S., Jeremy, R. J., Kramer, J. H.,
et al. (2012). Processing speed delays contribute to executive function deficits in
individuals with agenesis of the corpus callosum. J. Int. Neuropsychol. Soc. 18,
521–529. doi: 10.1017/S1355617712000045
Moes, P., Schilmoeller, K., and Schilmoeller, G. (2009). Physical, motor, sensory
and developmental features associated with genesis of the corpus callosum.
Child Care Health Dev. 35, 656–672. doi: 10.1111/j.1365-2214.2009.00942.x
Moutard, M. L., Kieffer, V., Feingold, J., Kieffer, F., Lewin, F., Adamsbaum,
C., et al. (2003). Agenesis of corpus callosum: prenatal diagnosis and
prognosis. Childs Nerv. Syst. 19, 471–476. doi: 10.1007/s00381-003-
0781-6
Paul, L. K., Brown, W. S., Adolphs, R., Tyszka, J. M., Richards, L. J., Mukherjee,
P., et al. (2007). Agenesis of the corpus callosum: genetic, development
and functional aspects of connectivity. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 8, 287–299.
doi: 10.1038/nrn2107
Paul, L. K., Corsello, C., Kennedy, D. P., and Adolph, R. (2014). Agenesis
of the corpus callous and autism: a comprehensive comparison. Brain 137,
1813–1829. doi: 10.1093/barin/awu070
Paul, L. K., Van Lancker, D., Schieffer, B., Dietrich, R., and Brown, W. S.
(2003). Communicative deficits in individuals with agenesis of the corpus
callosum: nonliteral language and affective prosody. Brain Lang. 85, 313–324.
doi: 10.1016/S0093-934X(03)00062-2
Pelphrey, K. A., Sasson, N. J., Reznick, J. S., Paul, G., Goldman, B. D., and Piven, J.
(2002). Visual scanning of faces in autism. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 32, 249–261.
Perner, J., Frith, U., Leslie, A. M., and Leekam, S. R. (1989). Exploration of the
autistic child’s theory of mind: knowledge, belief, and communication. Child
Dev. 60, 689–700.
Sauerwein, H. C., Nolin, P., and Lassonde, M. (1994). “Cognitive functioning in
callosal agenesis,” in Callosal Agenesis: A Natural Split Brain? eds M. Lassonde,
M. A. Jeeves (New York, NY: Plenum Press), 221–234.
Symington, S. H., Paul, L. K., Symington, M. F., Ono, M., and Brown, W. S.
(2010). Social cognition in individuals with agenesis of the corpus callosum.
Soc. Neurosci. 5, 296–308. doi: 10.1080/17470910903462419
Sztriha, L. (2005). Spectrum of corpus callosum agenesis. Pediatr. Neurol. 32,
94–101. doi: 10.1016/j.pediatrneurol.2004.09. 007
Turk, A. A., Brown, W. S., Symingtion, M., and Paul, L. K. (2010).
Social narratives in agenesis of the corpus callosum: linguistic analysis
of the thematic apperception test. Neuropsychologia 48, 43–50.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.08.009
Wahl, M., Strominger, Z., Jeremy, R. J., Barkovich, A. J., Wakahiro, M., and Sherr,
E. H. (2009). Variability of homotopic and heterotopic callosal connectivity
in partial agenesis of the corpus callosum: a 3T diffusion tensor imaging
and Q-ball tractography study. AJNR Am. J. Neuroradiol. 30, 282–289.
doi: 10.3174/ajnr.A1361
Wang, L. W., Huang, C. C., and Yeh, T. F. (2004). Major brain lesion detected on
sonographic screening of apparently normal term neonates.Neuroradiology 46,
368–373. doi: 10.1007/s00234-003-1160-4
Weaver, B., and Wuensch, K. L. (2013). SPSS and SAS programs for comparing
Pearson correlations and OLS regression coefficients. Behav. Res. Methods 45,
880–895. doi: 10.3758/s13428-012-0289-7
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2017 Lábadi and Beke. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 94
